

TACKLING THE IRAN-U.S. CRISIS: THE NEED FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT

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Central Asia and the Persian Gulf region have been engulfed in turmoil and instability with global ramifications for the last several decades. The region has been the scene of super-power rivalry and competition as well as major-power understanding and cooperation. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to one of the bloodiest Cold War confrontations, while during the same period, the Iran-Iraq war created a unique opportunity for both superpowers and most other powers to support the same side.

This region has also been the scene of the most amazing and drastic shifts in United States alliances. Before they turned against their benefactors, Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda began as major assets for—if not creations of—the United States in the war against communism and later in the campaign against Iran.¹

The turmoil in this region has shown that major-power rivalry has not been the sole source of the region's miseries, because significant episodes of major-power cooperation did not bring about positive change. The source of trouble is not extremism either, as it has been a symptom and not the cause; not to mention the fact that today's extremists were once close allies of their current antagonists. The problem lies in the prevailing paradigm, founded on the need for an enemy—real, perceived, imaginary or artificially manufactured—as a convenient tool for governance and global interactions. The resulting double standards, short-sighted policies, political and military domination and imposition continue to nurture conflict, insecurity, arms races, dictatorship and extremism.²

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CONTEXT OF IRAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Iran has suffered tremendously from the enemy paradigm. In this context, it became the victim of a war, launched by Saddam Hussein on 22 September 1980, which was miserably dealt with by the international community.³ The Iranian people

experienced war and destruction on the battlefields and in their homes, thanks to Saddam's doctrine of total war. Massive diplomatic, financial and military support for the aggressor from every corner of the world added insult to injury. When Saddam invaded Iran and swiftly advanced to occupy 30,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory, it took seven days for the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution, presumably based on the widely held belief that the war would bring down the

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newly established revolutionary government within a week.⁴ Even after seven days, the Security Council did not make the routine call for a cease-fire and withdrawal, nor consider Saddam's invasion of Iran a threat against international peace and security.⁵ In the course of the war, the United States joined the Soviet Union and France in providing Iraq with military hardware and intelligence, and even the material for chemical and biological weapons along with German and other Western companies.⁶ The Security Council was prevented for several years, and in spite of mounting evidence and UN reports, from dealing with the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iranian civilians and soldiers.⁷

Iran has also been directly affected by turmoil in the neighborhood. Iran welcomed the removal of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. However, the turmoil, insecurity and extremism present since the aftermath of invasion and foreign occupation have had a detrimental impact on Iran's security and development. Iran had warned the Security Council about these consequences before the invasion: "We all have an idea of the unparalleled disaster that a possible war could bring about. The humanitarian crisis in Iraq and in the neighboring countries might take catastrophic dimensions. The threat of disintegration of Iraq and instability in the region is significant. The fact that extremism stands to benefit the most from a war is undeniable."⁸ An increasingly bloody sectarian clash, initiated by terrorists and fanned by politicians, is now threatening the entire region.

This turbulent experience—in addition to the more classic geopolitical determinants—has influenced Iran's national security doctrine. From a geopolitical perspective—unlike few other countries in the region that have felt suffocated and have historically espoused expansionist tendencies—Iran has been content with its geography and human and natural resources, and thus has not had to invade any other country in the past 250 years. As the most powerful country in its immediate neighborhood, Iran has always found it necessary to engage in confidence-building with its neighboring states to address their understandable concerns arising from power and size disparities, and also in order to offset extra-regional agitations.

For the same geo-strategic reasons, Iran has historically considered stability in the region to be vital to its own security and development. Recognition of this reality motivated Iran to play an instrumental role in efforts to stabilize Tajikistan and

Afghanistan. Iran's role in the Bonn Conference and its contributions to the stability and development of Afghanistan—in spite of Iran's difficulties with the United States—has been widely recognized, including by senior U.S. officials.⁹

The same policy considerations have applied to Iraq. Despite its opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Tehran was the first capital in the region to recognize and support the Iraqi Governing Council—established after the fall of Saddam—and has maintained excellent relations with all post-Saddam governments, whose senior officials have consistently rejected U.S. allegations of Iranian interference.¹⁰ According to the *Los Angeles Times*, “The Iraqi government is moving to solidify relations with Iran, even as the United States turns up the rhetorical heat and bolsters its military forces to confront Tehran’s influence in Iraq.”¹¹ The closest U.S. allies in Iraq have also strongly protested U.S. policies and behavior against Iran in Iraq.¹²

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While Iran played a constructive role regarding various issues affecting the region, Iranian decisionmakers also recognized that advancing Iran's national security necessitates a more structural paradigm shift from regional rivalries and mistrust caused by exclusion and block-formations to regional cooperation and confidence through inclusion and participation.

In 1986 at the height of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran proposed the establishment of a security and cooperation arrangement in the Persian Gulf region to ensure stability and prevent the widening of the Iran-Iraq war.¹³ This proposal was initially well received, even incorporated into UN Security Council Resolution 598, but never implemented.

In 1999, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Iran officially proposed to “change [the global] security paradigm,” and “to replace military block security umbrellas with a new and innovative concept of *Global Security Networking*...for an inclusive and participatory global security, which uses the existing mechanisms in a complimentary rather than competing schemes.”¹⁴

Following the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran proposed that “it is time to finally establish an indigenous and internationally guaranteed regional security arrangement under United Nations auspices. The momentum created by the removal of Saddam Hussein should be used to replace mistrust and the arms race with mutual security and transparency.”¹⁵

Another important component of Iran's security doctrine—also partly shaped by its own experience—is the elimination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), strengthening and universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the establishment of a zone free from such weapons in the Middle East. This policy has important ideological and strategic underpinnings, but emotionally it is rooted in

the fact that Iranian civilians and soldiers were victims of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq.

Based on Islamic jurisprudence, the development and use of weapons with indiscriminate impact on the population and the environment are prohibited. The leader of the Islamic Republic has issued a religious decree against WMDs and specifically against the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.¹⁶ In practice, the UN found that Iran had not used chemical weapons, even in retaliation for Iraq's massive use of these weapons against Iranian soldiers and civilians.¹⁷

From a strategic point of view, Iranian leaders realize that nuclear weapons do not provide domestic stability or external security.¹⁸ Nuclear might did not prevent the break up of the Soviet empire, nor has it been a factor in recent conflicts in the Middle East.¹⁹ Iran's policy makers believe that development or possession of nuclear weapons undermine Iranian security. Even the perception that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons negatively impacts Iran's power by decreasing its regional influence and increasing its global vulnerabilities.

Iran does not need nuclear weapons to protect its regional interests in the immediate neighborhood. In fact, to augment Iranian influence in the region, it has been necessary for Iran to win the confidence of its neighbors; an effort that will inevitably suffer from such perceptions. Furthermore, with its current state of technological development and military capability, Iran cannot reasonably rely on nuclear deterrence against its adversaries in the international arena or in the wider region. Engaging in a spiraling arms race to establish and maintain nuclear deterrence would also be prohibitively expensive, draining the limited economic resources of the country.

Furthermore, Iran has been one of the more active participants in international efforts to eliminate WMDs and one of the most outspoken proponents of full implementation, strengthening and universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.²⁰ For example, Iran reacted to nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in the 1990s by dispatching its foreign minister to the Conference on Disarmament to propose the redoubling of global efforts to universalize the Non-Proliferation Treaty.²¹

THE MANUFACTURING OF A NEW CRISIS

In spite of Iran's record, a massive campaign has been underway to portray Iran as a proliferator of nuclear weapons and a threat to regional stability. The recent flurry of diplomatic activities and divisive public statements—primarily by the United States and the United Kingdom—to frighten the countries of the region and to create an anti-Iran coalition has become the centerpiece of a strategy to rescue the failed policies of the United States in the region.²² According to the *Wall Street Journal*, "The threat of Iran's rise has become for the U.S. a sort of diplomatic

glue...to patch together an alliance aimed at helping heal not only Iraq, but also Lebanon and the Palestinian conflict...[U.S. allies] are...apprehensive about lining up too publicly alongside the U.S. in a Cold War-style, anti-Iran bloc.”²³

The enemy paradigm is so pervasive that the U.S. administration opted for an escalation against Iran contrary to the advice of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group. The surge in blaming Iran for the insecurity and sectarian violence in Iraq is designed to justify the escalation, while such claims cannot be explained by facts on the ground or by any calculation of Iranian

interest in Iraq. In fact, U.S. vision has been so blurred by the prevalence of the paradigm, that American policymakers alienate and threaten Iran, while seeking help from those who have magnified—and instigated for their own motives—the sectarian divide in Iraq long before sectarian clashes started.²⁴

This policy clearly illustrates that no lessons have been learnt from the devastation caused by many decades of the implementation of that policy in the Persian Gulf region.

The manufacturing of the “Iran Nuclear Crisis” has similarly shown that old habits die hard, and the same tendencies that caused the misery of the last four years continue to prevail in major power circles in Washington and London. The same cabal has orchestrated a massive campaign to portray Iran’s peaceful nuclear program as a threat, and in order to give that a semblance of international legitimacy, has resorted to substantial economic and political pressure to compel members of the Security Council to adopt two unwarranted resolutions within five months.²⁵

The campaign has involved attempts to doctor the evidence in order to create a national and global scare. According to a November 2006 article by Seymour Hersh, “The CIA found no conclusive evidence, as yet, of a secret Iranian nuclear-weapons program running parallel to the civilian operations that Iran has declared.” He also added that “the White House was hostile to [the CIA finding]” and may be trying “to prevent the CIA assessment from being incorporated into a forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian nuclear capabilities” because this finding complicates “the administration’s planning for a military attack against Iran.”²⁶

Attempts to manipulate intelligence estimates to serve specific policies against Iran are not new. The CIA, in November 1992, drafted a National Intelligence Estimate, which concluded that Iran could develop a nuclear weapon by 2000.²⁷ Similarly, the Israelis have been predicting for many years that “Iran will pass the point of no return in three to six months.”²⁸

What is available in the public domain corroborates Hersh’s assertions about activities currently underway to manipulate intelligence. Intelligence officials conceded in February 2006 that there was no evidence that Iran was actually trying to build a nuclear weapon.²⁹ The last National Intelligence Estimate also projected that

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even if Iran wanted to build nuclear weapons, it would not be able to do so before 2015.³⁰ In response, neoconservatives produced and widely circulated a House Intelligence Committee staff report on Iran's nuclear program, which sought to present a more alarming picture that could provide a pretext for greater adventurism.³¹ That report was so dangerously misleading that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found it necessary to officially dispute its central claims against Iran. The Agency called parts of the report "outrageous and dishonest," containing distortions of IAEA findings and "incorrect and misleading assertions."³²

The case being fabricated against Iran has been founded on what the IAEA Director-General has called an "assessment of intentions."³³ The *Washington Post* recently observed: "Lacking direct evidence, Bush administration officials argue that Iran's nuclear program must be a cover for bomb-making. Vice President Cheney recently said, 'They're already sitting on an awful lot of oil and gas. Nobody can figure why they need nuclear as well to generate energy.'"³⁴

NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR AN OIL-RICH COUNTRY

A review of objective facts would establish Iran's need for alternative sources of energy, including nuclear energy. According to a recently released study by the National Academy of Science, "Iran's energy demand growth has exceeded its supply growth," and therefore, "Iran's oil export will decline," or even "could go to zero within 12–19 years."³⁵ The study acknowledges that Iran's need for nuclear power is "genuine, because Iran relies on...proceeds from oil exports for most revenues, and could become politically vulnerable if exports decline." Nuclear reactors, the report adds, "will substitute for the power now generated by petroleum, thus, freeing petroleum for export."³⁶ Many other U.S. and western experts have reached the same conclusions.³⁷ In fact, Iran's current plans to produce 20,000 megawatts of nuclear electricity by 2020 may save Iran 190 million barrels of crude oil every year or nearly \$14 billion annually.

From an environmental perspective, more Western utilities are looking to nuclear power "because of the prospect of controls on fossil-fuel generated power, while possible climate-change legislation wouldn't affect nuclear power, which doesn't generate the same pollutants."³⁸

It is also significant that the same governments that are questioning the feasibility of Iran's nuclear energy program today, were actively supporting and competing for shares in that program over forty years ago, when Iran's population and energy demands were far lower than the current levels and oil production and export far higher (see Tables 1 and 2).³⁹ As pointed out by Professor William Beeman, "to have American officials express alarm over the exact same program is illogical at best and utterly disingenuous at worst."⁴⁰

Table 1. Iranian Fuel Consumption





Table 2. Iranian Crude Production and Export



Therefore, Iran's nuclear program is neither ambitious nor economically unjustifiable. Diversification—including the development of nuclear energy—is the only sound and responsible energy strategy for Iran. Moreover, Iran's energy diversification strategy is not concentrated solely on nuclear energy, but encompasses various other alternative and renewable sources.⁴¹

IRAN-WEST NUCLEAR PARTNERSHIP

Iran's peaceful nuclear program started in 1957, with the signing of a cooperation agreement with the United States.⁴² In 1967, an American company (AMF) helped to set up the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, operating a five megawatt research reactor.

Iran's pursuit of nuclear energy gained more momentum following a study in 1973 carried out by the U.S.-based Stanford Research Institute, which predicted Iran's need for nuclear energy and recommended the building of nuclear plants capable of generating 20,000 megawatts of electricity before 1994.⁴³ Accordingly, plans were made to construct up to twenty nuclear power stations across the country. Numerous contracts were signed with various Western companies to build nuclear power plants and train Iranian nuclear scientists as Western countries competed with one another in bids on Iran's nuclear projects.

The German firm Kraftwerk Union (a subsidiary of Siemens AG) was awarded the contract to build two nuclear reactors at Bushehr power plant in 1974 and started its construction operation in August 1975.⁴⁴ The same year, Iran signed a contract with a French company (Framatome) to build two 950 megawatt reactors at Darkhovin, south of the city of Ahvaz.⁴⁵

An extendible ten-year nuclear fuel contract was concluded with the United States and France in 1974 and 1975 respectively.⁴⁶ Iran also purchased a 10 percent share in a Eurodif uranium enrichment plant with the possibility of increasing its share to 15 percent in the coming years.⁴⁷

In 1976, Iran expressed its interest in acquiring uranium enrichment technology. South Africa agreed to supply \$700 million of yellowcake to Iran.⁴⁸ The United States followed suit. According to National Security Decision Memorandum 292, dated 22 April 1975, the U.S. President decided to "permit U.S. material to be fabricated into fuel in Iran for its own reactors and for pass-through to third countries with whom we have agreement." It also envisaged approving "reprocessing of U.S. material in a multinational plant in Iran."⁴⁹

In short, as a 1978 U.S. State Department memo summarized "we have been encouraged by Iran's efforts to broaden its non-oil energy base. We are hopeful that the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement will be finalized soon and that American companies will be able to play a role in Iran's nuclear energy program."⁵⁰ The shah of Iran had become the poster boy for the U.S. nuclear industry.⁵¹

THE BIRTH OF “PROLIFERATION CONCERNS”

The enthusiasm about Iran’s nuclear energy program was abruptly reversed following the Islamic Revolution. The same governments and officials who had encouraged Iranian nuclear program, started questioning Iran’s need for nuclear energy and its intentions. Former U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger wrote in the *Washington Post* in 2005 that “for a major oil producer such as Iran, nuclear energy is a wasteful use of resources.”⁵²

Thirty years ago, when Henry Kissinger was secretary of state for President Gerald Ford, he held that “introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran’s economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals.”⁵³ According to Kissinger: “I don’t think the issue of proliferation came up” because “they were an allied country.”⁵⁴

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Kissinger’s explanation clearly indicates that the issue is neither need for energy nor concern for proliferation, but rather pattern of bilateral relations.

As a result of U.S. bilateral considerations, cloaked in nonproliferation terminology, the competition to bid for participation in Iran’s nuclear industry turned into accusations, cancellations and obstructions. Following the revolution, the United States halted the supply of fuel for the U.S.-built research reactor.⁵⁵ French and German contractors, engaged in building the nuclear power plants, withdrew from Iran in March 1979, and the West German government announced that it would not issue export licenses required to complete the 85-percent-finished Bushehr reactor.⁵⁶

As Iran was forced to turn to new countries to complete the unfinished projects, a concerted diplomatic campaign to dissuade possible participants in Iran’s peaceful nuclear programs was pursued as a matter of U.S. nonproliferation strategy. As a result, China withdrew from the building of a uranium conversion facility in Isfahan, forcing Iran to complete the project on its own.⁵⁷ Several subcontractors were persuaded by the United States to withdraw from the Bushehr power plant, being built by Russia following the German abrogation of the original contract.⁵⁸ Russia was subjected to massive pressure to abandon the project.

As a result, Iran was left with no option but to be discrete in its peaceful activities. In doing so, Iran remained within the confines of the NPT and did not divert its peaceful program to military activities. Meanwhile, in order to avoid the U.S.-led restrictions and impediments, Iran refrained from disclosing the details of its programs, which in nearly all cases—including the most publicized cases of the Natanz enrichment facility and the Arak heavy water plant—it was not obliged to disclose under the terms of its existing safeguards agreement with the IAEA.⁵⁹

FLUCTUATING RED-LINES

The United States maintained its active opposition to any Iranian nuclear facility, including a light water reactor, throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The pressure on Russia to abandon the construction of Bushehr facility continued until 2004. As State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher pointed out on 31 January 2003, “we have consistently urged Russia to cease all such cooperation with Iran, including its assistance to the light water reactor at Bushehr.”⁶⁰

In 2004, the United States changed its nonproliferation threshold from objecting to any nuclear facility in Iran to objecting to enrichment activities.⁶¹ Advancing familiar arguments based on questioning the Iranian need for enrichment, challenging its intentions and raising proliferation concerns about enrichment activities, the United States pushed forcefully to compel Iran to abandon its enrichment activities, even pressuring the Security Council to adopt two resolutions within five months calling on Iran to suspend these activities.

In fact, requiring Iran to stop enrichment has been the primary—and possibly the sole—reason for bringing the Iranian case to the Security Council. An informal paper titled, “Options for Addressing Iran’s Nuclear Program at the UN Security Council,” circulated by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in October 2004 states: “The United States has long believed that Iran’s nuclear activities must be reported to the UN Security Council...The UNSC has the legal authority to *require Iran to stop [its enrichment program]*.” The Political Director of the British Foreign Office, in a letter addressed to his counterparts in France, Germany and the United States on 16 March 2006, revealed that: “We may also need to remove one of the Iranian arguments that the suspension called for is ‘voluntary.’ We could do [that] by making the voluntary suspension a mandatory requirement to the Security Council.”⁶²


ENRICHMENT AND NUCLEAR FUEL

Like the previous fluctuating contentions about Iran’s need for nuclear energy, the assertions about the feasibility of fuel production for Iran are marred by political rather than technical or factual considerations. This assertion is supported by the fact that such concerns did not exist during the shah’s regime, when the United States was prepared to offer Iran not only enrichment but even reprocessing.⁶³

Realities on the ground suggest that some may want to continue monopolizing the increasingly lucrative nuclear fuel market through an exclusive, restrictive and politically charged club of nuclear fuel providers. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, “processed uranium ore, [is] already up more than 800% since 2001.” Serious problems such as the lack of “world-wide supplies of uranium and lack of enrichment facilities to turn the uranium into fuel for power plants” characterize the international nuclear fuel market.⁶⁴

Furthermore, “enrichment facilities...have already pledged their services because

Table 3. Uranium Prices



of growing interest in nuclear fuel.” According to a senior researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “the supply issues mean that it will take heroic efforts to fuel the expected growth in nuclear power by 2015. Under the most positive assumptions you might just get there. But they may not pan out.” Experts also believe that “most non-Russian suppliers already have promised their supplies of enriched uranium to buyers.”⁶⁵

With such scarcity, uncertainty, fragility, exclusiveness and high prices governing the international nuclear fuel markets, nations, particularly countries like Iran that have the potential ability to produce their own fuel, cannot be expected to solely rely upon outside fuel supplies.

While domestic production of fuel for nuclear power plants makes economic sense, Iran’s decision should not be judged solely on economic grounds. Unlike most other nuclear-fuel consumers, Iran has been under U.S.-driven export restrictions on every aspect of the nuclear industry, including fuel. Therefore, Iran cannot solely rely on procurement of fuel from outside sources. Such dependence would in effect hold Iran’s multi-billion dollar investment in power plants hostage to the political whims of suppliers in a tightly controlled market. For this reason, Iran was required to create a contingency fuel program simultaneously with the construction of its nuclear power plants. The efforts to gain the necessary technology and develop the capability for fuel production are time-consuming and, unless pursued simultaneously with plant construction, those plants may become obsolete due to the denial of foreign fuel without a contingency capacity to produce it domestically.

Production of fuel for peaceful purposes is universally recognized as lawful under the NPT. It is, in fact, a part of member states' "inalienable right" to nuclear technology explicitly recognized in Article IV of the Treaty. Manufactured, or even real, proliferation concerns cannot be used to curtail this inalienable right. As Article IV of the treaty stipulates, "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty."

Any nuclear activity may entail proliferation concerns. But there are internationally-agreed mechanisms to address such concerns, which apply to fuel cycle programs as well. They include the IAEA Safeguards and the Additional Protocol. In addition, experts gathered by the IAEA to address such proliferation concerns have suggested various alternatives, most notably the establishment of international and regional facilities for uranium enrichment and conversion of current facilities to such multinational schemes.⁶⁶ Iran has been the only country, with comparable technology, that has been prepared to implement these proposals.

THE QUESTION OF "CONCEALMENT"

Another argument that has been advanced to question Iran's peaceful intentions has been Iranian concealment of nuclear activities. As discussed earlier, Iran was forced to be discrete about its peaceful nuclear activities as a result of a concerted U.S. effort over the past twenty-seven years to prevent cooperation with Iran with regard to its peaceful nuclear program. However, throughout this period, Iran placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards.⁶⁷ While discrete, it did not violate the NPT by diverting its program to military use.⁶⁸ Had it done so during the "18 years of concealment," the IAEA would have been able to find at least some indications during its unprecedented scrutiny of Iran since 2003, when the IAEA conducted over 2,000 person-days of inspection of all Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran even allowed the IAEA to visit its military sites more than twenty times. The IAEA did not find anything in these sites—which it had requested to visit following allegations made primarily by the United States—to have any connection to Iran's nuclear program.⁶⁹

Thorough inspections by the IAEA resulted in repeated statements by the IAEA that it found no evidence of non-peaceful activity in Iran.⁷⁰ In November 2003 and in the wake of sensational media reports, the Agency confirmed that "to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities...were related to a nuclear weapons programme."⁷¹ Similar conclusions can be found in the most recent IAEA reports, which state that "As indicated to the Board in November 2004, and again in September 2005, all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for...the Agency has not seen any diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."⁷²

It is noteworthy that according to Seymour Hersh, the CIA concurs with this assessment: "Additional data have been gathered...by high-tech (and highly classified) radioactivity-detection devices that clandestine American and Israeli agents placed near suspected nuclear-weapons facilities inside Iran in the past year. No significant amounts of radioactivity were found."⁷³

In face of mounting evidence on the absence of any unlawful activity, one IAEA statement that asserted it is not yet in a position "to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran" has been used to incriminate Iran.⁷⁴ But the concurrent acknowledgment of the IAEA in the same report that "the process of drawing such a conclusion...is a time consuming process," has been conveniently ignored. Ignored also is the fact that, according to the IAEA, forty-five other countries are in the same category as Iran, including fourteen nations in Europe.⁷⁵

NEGOTIATING FOR A SOLUTION?

Iran has always been prepared for time-bound and unconditional negotiations to find a mutually acceptable solution. In October 2003, Iran entered into an understanding with France, Germany and the United Kingdom to reverse the existing trend to one based on full transparency, cooperation and access to nuclear and other advanced technologies.⁷⁶ Accordingly, Iran signed, and immediately began full implementation of, the Additional Protocol to the NPT, continued to implement it until 2006 and opened its doors to one of the most robust inspections in IAEA history. Iran also voluntarily suspended its enrichment of uranium for over two years in order to build confidence and allow time to find a mutually acceptable solution.⁷⁷

Iran strived to reach such solutions by offering various proposals to change the nature of its relations with Europe and also to provide technical, political and monitoring assurances of the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Based on Europe's own experience with integration and confidence building through the OSCE process, Iran proposed a political package to the European three, which included practical measures for cooperation in the fields of elimination and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, export controls, combating terrorism, promotion of regional stability, and security and defense arrangements.⁷⁸

Using models developed by independent experts on technical, legal and political measures to allay proliferation concerns, Iran offered a comprehensive package, which allowed continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at the conversion and enrichment facilities—a measure that goes far beyond the most intrusive inspection regimes to provide unsurpassed guarantees. It also envisaged the imposition of ceilings on the level and scope of enrichment in Iran as well as incremental and phased implementation of its enrichment program.⁷⁹ In that package, Iran proposed to ask the IAEA "to develop an optimized arrangement on numbers, monitoring mechanism

and other specifics for an initial limited operation at Natanz,” in order to ally any proliferation concerns.⁸⁰

To address concerns about Iran’s commitment to the NPT once it reaches a certain level of advancement, Iran offered to provide guarantees that it would never withdraw from the NPT, and to resume the implementation of the intrusive inspection regime of the Additional Protocol in the context of a negotiated settlement.⁸¹

Finally, using the model suggested by the IAEA experts, Iran proposed to convert its enrichment facilities to regional or multinational schemes, which provide the greatest degree of transparency by allowing the concerned parties to participate in the ownership and operation of these facilities.⁸² It may be interesting to note that

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this model was favored by the United States in the 1970s with regard to Iran’s enrichment and even reprocessing plans. National Security Memorandum 292 of 22 April 1975 indicates that the U.S. President approved the following negotiating position with Iran:

Continue to require U.S. approval for reprocessing of U.S. supplied fuel, while indicating that the establishment of a multinational reprocessing plant would be an important factor favoring such approval. As a fallback, we would be prepared to inform the Government of Iran that we shall be prepared to provide our approval for reprocessing of U.S. material in a multinational plant in Iran if the country supplying the reprocessing technology or equipment is a full and active participant in the plant.⁸³

However, none of these proposals, which were presented by Iran from January 2005 to October 2006, received any meaningful consideration, primarily due to the tendency of the United States to manufacture a nuclear crisis instead of searching for a solution. It is instructive to note that Iran’s proposal for the establishment of an international consortium was initially considered very promising by EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, leading to public statements of progress following his meetings with Iran’s nuclear negotiator.⁸⁴ These statements were abruptly and rapidly reversed, as paradigm-driven political considerations replaced objective diplomatic and technical negotiations.⁸⁵

Ironically, the same resistance to searching for solutions persisted even when the United States and its European allies, along with Russia and China took the initiative and presented a set of proposals to Iran on 6 June 2006. Iran welcomed these proposals as containing positive elements and announced that it would offer its detailed response on 22 August 2006, which it did.⁸⁶ However, the United States and its European allies did not wait for the Iranian reply, and hastily presented and pushed through the Security Council Resolution 1696 on 31 July 2006.

The fact that they did not wait for the Iranian reply before adopting Security Council Resolution 1696, as well as other available evidence, indicates that the

proposal did not have the intention of finding a mutually acceptable solution, but instead was geared towards ensuring Russian and Chinese support for Security Council sanctions. This is stated in unambiguous terms in a letter from the British political director, in which he advised his American, French and German counterparts that:

We are not going to bring the Russians and Chinese to accept significant sanctions over the coming months, certainly not without further efforts to bring the Iranians around.... In return for the Russians and Chinese agreeing to [a Chapter VII resolution], we would then want to put together a package that could be presented to the Iranians as a new proposal.⁸⁷

As Gareth Porter has observed, "A track record of the events related to the P5+1 proposal shows that the Bush administration was determined from the beginning that the package would fail, so that it could bring to a halt a multilateral diplomacy on Iran's nuclear program that the hardliners in the administration had always found a hindrance to their policy."⁸⁸

It was also clear to the United States and its European allies that Security Council action would not help to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem. Iran's cooperation with the Agency was far more extensive and comprehensive before the United States and its allies pressured the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2005 to engage the Security Council. That cooperation enabled the IAEA to conclude in its report in September 2005 that good progress had been made "in the Agency's ability to confirm certain aspects of Iran's current declarations, which will be followed up as a routine safeguards implementation matter."⁸⁹ In fact, the involvement by the Security Council hindered this process, because it moved the issue to a clearly confrontational stage.

Furthermore, adoption of resolutions in the Security Council does not bestow legitimacy to an essentially unilateralist policy, which regards the Council as merely a "tool in the toolbox."⁹⁰ The use of political pressure and financial resources to sway votes in the Security Council is an open secret, documented recently in a study at Harvard University.⁹¹ The resolutions against Iran provide a revealing example of this pattern, particularly if one compares the votes in the Security Council with the declared positions of heads of state of the Non-Aligned Movement and foreign ministers of the Islamic countries, comprising nearly two-thirds of UN members, who supported Iran's positions as recently as September 2006 and expressed concern about policies pursued inside the Security Council.⁹²

WHAT LIES AHEAD

Sanctions and pressure against Iran may satisfy some domestic constituencies or settle some old scores.⁹³ But it is the overwhelming view of informed observers that they will not achieve their stated objectives. They more likely will unravel the non-proliferation regime, exacerbate tension, perpetuate the enemy paradigm and

lead to unwanted—even accidental—escalations. Recent reports indicate that a proliferation-sensitive race may have already become a self-fulfilling prophecy in the region, even though this race is against an imaginary threat.

We have all been through this before. The Persian Gulf region and the world at large have paid dearly for similar policies in the past. There are real crises that need to be resolved, before embarking on manufacturing new ones. Ending the quagmire in Iraq is a formidable challenge that requires not only collective effort but also a reassessment and reversal of policies and approaches that have brought so much misery to all concerned.

The interests of Iran and the United States, as well as security and stability in the Persian Gulf region, have long been hostage to an outdated paradigm sustained by mutual mistrust and heavy historical baggage, and nurtured with fact or fiction generated by those benefiting from confrontation and war.

Iran has a national security interest in restoring regional stability and preserving and strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation. But, preventing the manufactured “Iran threat” from becoming the next global nightmare requires a drastic change in the U.S. approach—an approach that until now has impeded a genuine search for alternatives. ♔

NOTES

¹ According to PBS Frontline, Saddam was recruited by the CIA while in Cairo in the 1950s. According to United Press International, he was used by the United States to plan a coup against General Abdulkarim Qassim. His collaboration with the United States after assuming power in 1979 has been widely documented. See Richard Sale “Exclusive: Saddam key in early CIA plot,” *United Press International*, 4 October 2003. On Al-Qaeda, see, *inter alia*, Alexandra Richard, “The CIA met Bin Laden while undergoing treatment at an American hospital last July in Dubai,” *Le Figaro*, 11 October 2001, and Lara Marlowe, “U.S. efforts to make peace summed up by ‘oil’,” *Irish Times*, 19 November 2001.

² For a more detailed discussion, see M. Javad Zarif, “Reflections on Terrorism, Dialogue and Global Ethics,” *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 3, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 21-25. See also the book written by the United Nations Group of Eminent Persons on Dialogue among Civilizations of which the author is a member, *Crossing the Divide: Dialogue among Civilizations*, (South Orange, NJ: Seton Hall University, 2001).

³ “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 598,” 9 December 1991, S/23273.

⁴ Robert Fisk, “How the West armed Saddam, fed him intelligence on his enemies, equipped him for atrocities and then made sure he wouldn’t squeal,” *Independent*, 31 December 2006.

⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 479, 28 September 1980, “Calls upon Iran and Iraq to refrain immediately from any further use of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means and in conformity with principles of justice and international law...” The first Security Council resolution calling for withdrawal (SCR 514 of 12 July 1982) was adopted only after Iran had already pushed out the invading forces.

⁶ Patrick E. Tyler, “Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas,” *New York Times*, 18 August 2002; Robert Fisk and Christopher Dickey, “Death of a Tyrant,” *Newsweek*, 8 January 2007. A U.S. Senate inquiry in 1995 accidentally revealed that during the Iran-Iraq war the U.S. had sent Iraq samples of all the strains of germs used by the latter to make biological weapons. The strains were sent by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [sic] and the American Type Culture Collection to the same sites in Iraq that UN weapons inspectors later determined were part of Iraq’s biological weapons program. See Matt Kelley, “U.S. Supplied Germs to Iraq in 80’s,” *Associated Press*, 1 October 2002. See also Norm

Dixon, "How he [sic] U.S. Armed Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons," *Green Left Weekly*, 28 August 2002, <http://www.greenleft.org.au/2002/506/27605> and Patrick E. Tyler, *Die Tageszeitung*, 17 December 2002. On chemical weapons, see Tony Patterson, "Leaked report says German and U.S. firms supplied arms to Saddam," *Independent*, 18 December 2002: "Iraq's 11,000-page report to the UN Security Council lists 150 foreign companies, including some from America, Britain, Germany and France, that supported Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programme.... British officials said the list of companies appeared to be accurate. Eighty German firms and 24 U.S. companies are reported to have supplied Iraq with equipment and know-how for its weapons programmes from 1975 onwards.... It is not known who leaked the report, but it could have come from Iraq. Baghdad is keen to embarrass the U.S. and its allies by showing the close involvement of U.S., German, British and French firms in helping Iraq develop its weapons of mass destruction when the country was a bulwark against the much feared spread of Iranian revolutionary fervour to the Arab world. The list contained the names of long-established German firms such as Siemens as well as U.S. multi-nationals.... Ten French companies were also named along with a number of Swiss and Chinese firms.... The five permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, Britain, Russia, France and China—have repeatedly opposed revealing the extent of foreign companies' involvement, although a mass of relevant information was collected by UN weapons inspectors who visited the country between 1991 and 1998. The UN claims that publishing the extent of the companies' involvement in Iraq would jeopardise necessary co-operation with such firms."

⁷ "Report of the Specialists Appointed by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning the Use of Chemical Weapons," 26 March 1984, S/16433; "Letter Dated 17 April 1985 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," 24 April 1985, S/17127; "Report of the Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq," 12 March 1986, S/17911. As for the reaction by the United States and the Security Council, a former Defense Intelligence Agency official told the *New York Times* "the Pentagon 'was not so horrified by Iraq's use of gas.... It was just another way of killing people.'" See Patrick E. Tyler, "Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas," *New York Times*, 18 August 2002.

⁸ Statement before the Security Council, 11 March 2003.

⁹ See, *inter alia*, James Dobbins, "Time to Deal With Iran," *Washington Post*, 6 May 2004, and Steven R. Weisman, "U.S. Takes Softer Tone on Iran, Once in the 'Axis of Evil,'" *New York Times*, 29 October 2003.

¹⁰ "Talabani 'trusts in Iran support'," *BBC News*, 21 November 2005; Aparisim Ghosh, "Is Iran Controlling Iraqi Militias?" *Time*, 25 August 2006; Ellen Knickmeyer, "British Find No Evidence of Arms Traffic From Iran," *Washington Post*, 4 October 2006.

¹¹ Louise Roug and Borzou Daragahi, "Iraq Edges Closer to Iran, With or Without the US," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 January 2007.

¹² "Iraq Urges U.S. to Free 5 Iranians," *Chicago Tribune*, 15 January 2007; Kim Games, "Iraq says U.S. raid hit liaison office," *Star Telegram*, 13 January 2007; "Iraqi Kurdish party leader Barzani condemns U.S. raid on Iranian consulate," *Islamic Republic News Agency*, 11 January 2007; "Controversy erupts as U.S. arrests six in raid on 'Iranian consulate'," *Agence France-Presse*, 11 January 2007; "Arrested Iranians 'were trying to influence Iraqi government' - BBC," *Agence France-Presse*, 4 January 2007.

¹³ The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran in his letter dated 29 May 1986 to the UN Secretary-General stressed that "The Persian Gulf is one of the most sensitive strategic areas in the world and the maintenance and guaranteeing of peace and stability in this region is a question of vital significance," and proposed that the Secretary-General should launch an initiative "to secure long-term peace and security in the region, based on the principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity...." S/18381, 6 October 1986.

¹⁴ Statement by M. Javad Zarif, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, at the Conference on Disarmament, CD/pv.812, 2 February 1999.

¹⁵ M. Javad Zarif, "A Neighbor's Vision of the New Iraq," *New York Times*, 10 May 2003.

¹⁶ *Kayhan*, 6 November 2004, quoting from Ayatollah Khamenei's Friday Sermon on 5 November 2004.

¹⁷ See *inter alia* reports of several UN investigative missions contained in UN Security Council Documents: "Report of the Specialists Appointed by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations by

the Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning the Use of Chemical Weapons,” 26 March 1984, S/16433; “Letter Dated 17 April 1985 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” 24 April 1985, S/17127; “Report of the Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, 12 March 1986, S/17911; “Note by the President of the Security Council,” 21 March 1986, S/17932.

¹⁸ “These nuclear arsenals will not benefit anyone.... If the nuclear bomb could have saved anyone, it would have prevented the collapse of the Soviet Union. If the nuclear bomb could have created security, it would have prevented, perhaps, September 11th. If the nuclear bomb could have done anything, it could have, perhaps, stopped the Palestinian intifada.” “President Ahmadinejad’s News Conference,” *Washington Post*, 21 September 2006.

¹⁹ See, for instance, Edith Bursac, “Israel’s Nuclear Policies and a NWFZ in the Middle East: How Feasible Is It?” (Report, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 15 November 2006).

²⁰ Concluding Statement by Dr. M. Javad Zarif at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, 27 May 2005.

²¹ Statement by the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the Conference on Disarmament, June 1998. He concluded by stating: “the recent developments have underlined the necessity of ensuring universality of the NPT.”

²² See, *inter alia*, Edward Luttwak, “President Bush has managed to divide and conquer the Middle East,” *Wall Street Journal*, 14 January 2007; Dan Murphy, “Can Rice rally Mideast against Iran?” *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 October 2006; Helene Cooper and David Sanger, “U.S. Plan Seeks to Wedge Syria Away From Iran,” *New York Times*, 23 July 2006. As for the United Kingdom, according to *BBC*, “Speaking on Iran’s doorstep in Dubai at the end of a tour of the Middle East, Mr. Blair chose to single out Iran as he called for an ‘alliance of moderation in the region and outside of it to defeat the extremists,’” Paul Reynolds, “Blair and the ‘Strategic Challenge’ of Iran,” *BBC News*, 20 December 2006.

²³ Gregg Jaffe and Neil King, Jr., “U.S. Courts Allies’ Support on Iran,” *Wall Street Journal*, 16 January 2007.

²⁴ Sectarian clash in Iraq was initially designed and implemented by Al-Qaeda and Zarqawi as a response to foreign occupation and perceived Shia collaboration. According to the *Stratfor Weekly*, “Attacks on the Shia were signaled early last month when a CD-ROM written by top al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was captured by U.S. forces. The document on the CD-ROM indicated a change in strategy, at least by the jihadist guerrilla faction, away from the United States and toward the Shiite community.” See “The War in Iraq: Redefining and Refocusing” *Stratfor Weekly*, 5 March 2004. The sectarian hatred was later fanned and expanded through the use of scare tactics—such as Shia Crescent—by regional politicians for ulterior political motives. These statements preceded the sectarian clashes in Iraq.

²⁵ See Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker, “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United,” *Global Policy Forum*, 25 August 2006.

²⁶ Seymour Hersh, “The Next Act,” *New Yorker*, 27 November 2006.

²⁷ Elaine Sciolino, “C.I.A. Says Iran Makes Progress On Atom Arms,” *New York Times*, 30 November 1992.

²⁸ See for instance, “Israel threatens strikes on Iranian nuclear targets,” *Scotsman*, 23 November 2003; “Mofaz said that in the course of the next year Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons would “reach the point of no return”; “Point of No Return,” *New York Sun*, 6 October 2004: “This followed a statement, quoted last month in Maariv, from the prime minister’s national security adviser, Giora Eiland, who said that Iran will reach the “point of no return” in its nuclear program by November.” “Sharon: Iran’s nuclear weapon program nears ‘point of no return,” *CNN*, 13 April 2005: “In a CNN interview, Sharon said Iran was years away from possessing a nuclear weapon—but could be just months away from overcoming ‘technical problems’ in building one”; Aaron Klein, “Israel: Iran 3 months to nuclear point of no return,” *WorldNet Daily*, 13 December 2005: “Iran will reach the point of no return and possess the capacity to build nuclear weapons within three months, Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff Dan Halutz warned today.”

²⁹ Dafna Linzer, “Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case Against Iran” *Washington Post*, 8 February 2006; also Dafna Linzer, “Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb” *Washington Post*, 2 August 2005; also David Albright, “When could Iran get the bomb?” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July-August 2006; see also John Negroponte interview with *BBC*, 2 June 2006 “[Iran] seems to be determined to develop nuclear weapons. We don’t have a clear-cut knowledge...”

³⁰ U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, 2005; see *Washington Post*, 2 August 2006.

³¹ "Staff Report of the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy," 23 August 2006. The report had been prepared by a former special assistant to Ambassador Bolton. See Dafna Linzer, "U.S. Spy Agencies Criticized On Iran; GOP-Led Panel Faults Intelligence," *Washington Post*, 24 August 2006: the U.S. media revealed that drafting of the said report "has not been the work of any intelligence agency, or the full intelligence panel, or even the subcommittee that ostensibly drafted it.... It has been written primarily by a former C.I.A. official known for his view that the assessments on Iran are not sufficiently dire."

³² Letter by the International Atomic Energy Agency dated 12 September 2006, addressed to Chairman of the Permanent Select Intelligence Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. See Dan Glaister, "IAEA says Congress report on Iran's nuclear capacity is erroneous and misleading," *Guardian*, 15 September 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,,1873114,00.html>.

³³ Christopher Dickey, "The Power of the Purse," *Newsweek*, 20 Oct 2006.

³⁴ Dafna Linzer, "Past Arguments Don't Square with Current Iran Policy," *Washington Post*, 27 March 2005.

³⁵ Roger Stern, "The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security," *PNAS* (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences) 104, no. 1377 (2 January 2007); International Monetary Fund, Islamic Republic of Iran: Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report 04/307 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2004).

³⁶ Stern.

³⁷ David R. Henderson, "Oil, Nuclear Power, and Iran: A Lesson in Opportunity Cost," *Wartime Economist*, 23 October 2006.

³⁸ John J. Fialka, "Nuclear Power Revival Could Encounter Hurdles" *Wall Street Journal*, 5 December 2006.

³⁹ Ministry of Energy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, "Energy for Sustainable Development" and "Statistical Report on 37 Years of Iranian Power Industry, 1967-2003".

⁴⁰ See, *inter alia*, William O. Beeman and Thomas Stauffer, "Is Iran Building Nukes? An Economic Analysis", *Pacific News Service*, 27 June 2003.

⁴¹ In addition to its ambitious major hydroelectric projects, Iran has over 1,100 small hydropower and wind farms under construction. The fourth five-year-development-plan of Iran sets the following quantitative goals: 80 MW from small-scale hydropower; 200 MW from wind farms; 100 MW from geothermal power plants; 17.25 MW from solar thermal power plants; 1 MW from fuel cells; 3 MW from photovoltaic and 1,000,000 m² from solar water heaters. See Ministry of Energy of Iran, "Statistical Report on 37 Years of Activity of Iran Electric Power Industry, 1967-2003," and Stern.

⁴² U.S. Department of State, "Atoms for Peace Agreement with Iran," (Department of State Bulletin 36, Washington DC: 15 April 1957), 629, as quoted in Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 84. See also, Oxford Research Group, "Chronology of Iran's Nuclear Programme (1957-present)," <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/programmes/globalsecurity/iranchronology.htm>; Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Nuclear Chronology 1957-1985," http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1825.html.

⁴³ See Mohammad Sahimi, "Iran's Nuclear Program. Part I: Its History," *Payvand*, 2 October 2003.

⁴⁴ Ann MacLachlan, "Iran Seeking Way To Finish Bushehr Plant But Bonn Denies Exports," *Nucleonics Week*, 30 October 1986; Akbar Etemad, "Iran into Uranium in Big Way," *Kayhan International*, 30 November 1974.

⁴⁵ Sahimi. Also see Iran Nuclear Watch, "Iran Nuclear Timeline," <http://irannuclearwatch.blogspot.com/2006/08/iran-nuclear-timeline.html>.

⁴⁶ See International Atomic Energy Agency, "Communication dated 12 September 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency."

⁴⁷ Ali Reza Jahan-Shahi, "Iran and France to Jointly Build Uranium Plant," *Tehran Journal*, 5 January 1975; Clyde H. Farnsworth, "France Gives Iran Stake in Uranium," *New York Times*, 4 January 1975.

⁴⁸ See *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, "Nuclear Chronology 1957-1985."

⁴⁹ Box 1, National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Gerald R. Ford Library <http://www.ford.utexas.edu/LIBRARY/document/nsdmnssm/nsdm292a.htm>.

⁵⁰ The U.S.-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement, "Department of State Memorandum," 20 October 1978, in Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

⁵¹ A full-page ad by Boston Edison and other New England utilities companies in major regional papers in the 1970s containing a standing picture of the former shah stated, "The Shah of Iran is sitting on top of one of the world's largest reservoirs of oil. Yet he is building two nuclear plants and planning two more to provide electricity for his country. He knows that oil is running out—and time with it." For a picture of the ad, see <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/ShahNuclearPlants.jpg>.

⁵² Dafna Linzer, "Past Arguments Don't Square With Current Iran Policy," *Washington Post*, 27 March 2005.

⁵³ Noam Chomsky, "A Negotiated Solution to the Iranian Nuclear Crisis is Within Reach," *Guardian*, 19 June 2006.

⁵⁴ Dafna Linzer, "Past Arguments Don't Square with Current Iran Policy," *Washington Post*, 27 March 2005.

⁵⁵ See *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, "Nuclear Chronology 1957-1985."

⁵⁶ Poneman, 96; Mark Hibbs, "German Officials Say Government May Not Let Bushehr Be Finished," *Nucleonics Week*, 7 February 1991. Also see "Iran Seeking Way to Finish Bushehr Plant But Bonn Denies Exports," *Nucleonics Week*, 30 October 1986.

⁵⁷ *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, "China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Iran."

⁵⁸ For instance, Ukraine was forced to cancel its contract to provide air conditioning for the facility under U.S. pressure. See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/62871.stm> and also <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/62730.stm>.

⁵⁹ Under the Safeguards agreement, Iran was not obliged to report activities until 180 days before introduction of uranium to a facility. In fact uranium was not introduced in Natanz until February 2006, and Iran officially informed the IAEA about that facility in 2002 and in February 2003, the IAEA Director-General visited the facility. As for Arak, heavy water plants are not covered by Safeguards. A heavy water reactor is covered, which has been placed under IAEA safeguards even before construction. See also Gordon Prather, "Nuke-Free Zone," *AntiWar*, 17 June 2006.

⁶⁰ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Russia-Iran Nuclear Cooperation," 31 January 2003.

⁶¹ Ambassador Kenneth C. Brill, "Statement of the Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran," (Speech to IAEA Board of Governors, 13 March 2004).

⁶² "Leaked Letter in Full: UK Diplomat Outlines Iran Strategy," *Times Online*, 22 March 2006.

⁶³ Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Decision Memorandum 292, 22 April 1975.

⁶⁴ Fialka.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ International Atomic Energy Agency, "Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency," IAEA INF-CIRC/640, 22 February 2005, 103, approaches 3, 4 and 5: "Promoting voluntary conversion of existing facilities to MNAs, and pursuing them as confidence-building measures, with the participation of NPT non-nuclear weapon States and nuclear weapon States, and non-NPT States," and "creating, through voluntary agreements and contracts, multinational, and in particular regional, MNAs for new facilities based on joint ownership, drawing rights or co-management for front-end and back-end nuclear facilities, such as uranium enrichment."

⁶⁷ International Atomic Energy Agency, "Report on the Implementation of NPT Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA GOV/2006/64, 14 November 2006, paragraph 20.

⁶⁸ Prather.

⁶⁹ International Atomic Energy Agency, "Report on the Implementation of NPT Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA GOV/2006/15, 27 February 2006, paragraphs 32 and 52; International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA GOV/2004/83, 15 November 2004 paragraph 102; International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA GOV/2005/67, 2 September 2005, paragraph 49; Statement by Deputy Director General of The IAEA before the Board of Governors, 1 March 2005 (GOV/OR.1119).

⁷⁰ International Atomic Energy Agency, "Report on the Implementation of NPT Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA GOV/2003/75, 10 November 2003, paragraph 52; International Atomic Energy Agency, "Report on the Implementation of NPT Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA GOV/2006/15, 27 February 2006, paragraph 53.

⁷¹ International Atomic Energy Agency, "Report on the Implementation of NPT Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA GOV/2004/11, 24 February 2004, paragraphs 72-73; International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA GOV/2004/34, 4 June 2004, paragraphs 40 and 43; International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA GOV/2004/60, 1 September 2004, paragraphs 55 and 60; International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA GOV/2005/67, 2 September 2005, 2 September 2005 paragraphs 53 and 55; GOV/2005/87, 18 November 2005, paragraph 17.

⁷² International Atomic Energy Agency, "Report on the Implementation of NPT Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA GOV/2006/15, 27 February 2006, paragraph 53.

⁷³ Hersh.

⁷⁴ International Atomic Energy Agency, "Report on the Implementation of NPT Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA GOV/2006/15, 27 February 2006, paragraph 53.

⁷⁵ IAEA - GOV/2005/67, paragraph 51. This is repeated again in IAEA - GOV/2006/15. IAEA - GOV/2006/31/Add.1 (15 June 2006).

⁷⁶ "Tehran declaration on nuclear programme," *Reuters*, 23 October 2003.

⁷⁷ IAEA- GOV/2006/15, Para 30: "until 6 February 2006,[Iran] implemented the Additional Protocol as if it were in force, including by providing, in a timely manner, the requisite declarations and access to locations." See International Atomic Energy Agency, "Communication dated 1 August 2005 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency," INF/CIRC/648, 1 August 2005, and Prather. Following agreements with EU3 in Brussels and Paris respectively, Iran further expanded its voluntary suspension in February 2004 (see GOV/2004/34) and November 2004 (see GOV/2005/67) to incorporate activities which go well beyond the original IAEA definition of "enrichment" and even "enrichment-related" activities, including the suspension of the Uranium Conversion Facility, implemented in November of 2004, which was considered by the IAEA secretariat in a Non-Paper dated 29 October 2003 as possible extra measures outside enrichment related activities.

⁷⁸ Iran's proposal of 17 January 2005 presented to EU3 in Geneva, 39-45; see http://www.un.int/iran/facts_about_peaceful_nuclear_program.pdf.

⁷⁹ Iran's package of 23 March 2005, proposed to EU3 in Paris. Ibid. 46-48.

⁸⁰ Iran's offer of 18 July 2005. See http://www.un.int/iran/facts_about_peaceful_nuclear_program.pdf.

⁸¹ See the Iranian Reply of 22 August 2006 to the P5+1 Package "Letter dated 11 October 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," 12 October 2006, S/2006/806, 13-14.

⁸² See note 66 above. See statement by Iranian President to the UN General Assembly on September 17, 2005, A/60/PV.10, 8. See also statement by Iranian Foreign Minister at the Conference on Disarmament on 30 March 2006, CD/PV.1015, 6-7. Iran made this offer again during the September and October 2006 talks between Iranian nuclear negotiator and EU Foreign Policy Chief.

⁸³ Box 1, National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Gerald R. Ford Library, <http://www.ford.utexas.edu/LIBRARY/document/nsdmnssm/nsdm292a.htm>.

⁸⁴ "EU's Solana Reports Progress in Iran Nuclear Talks," *USA Today*, 15 September 2006. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09-15-iran-eu_x.htm?csp=34.

⁸⁵ Elaine Sciolino, "Iran's Proposal to End Nuclear Standoff is Rejected by the West," *New York Times*, 4 October, 2006.

⁸⁶ UN Security Council, "Letter dated 11 October 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," 12 October 2006, S/2006/806.

⁸⁷ "Leaked letter in full: UK diplomat outlines Iran Strategy," *Times Online*, 22 March 2006.

⁸⁸ Gareth Porter, "U.S. made an offer Iran can only refuse," *Asia Times*, 24 August 2006.

⁸⁹ IAEA GOV/2005/67, paragraph 43.

⁹⁰ Statement by Ambassador Bolton at AIPAC Meeting, 5 March 2006: "(I)t is critical that we use the Council to help mobilize international public opinion. Rest assured, though, we are not relying on the Security Council as the only tool in our toolbox to address this problem." U.S. Department of State, <http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2006/Mar/06-846555.html>.

⁹¹ Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker, "According to this study: during the years in which the council's proceedings are most newsworthy, the increase in aid receipts to council members is.... Highly significant...countries lucky enough to serve during these years enjoyed a nearly 170% increase in U.S. aid." <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membership/electedmembers/2006/06howmuch.pdf>. Also see Heather Stewart, "US accused of using aid to sway votes in UN security council," *The Observer*, 17 December 2006: "The U.S. uses its aid budget to bribe those countries which have a vote in the United Nations Security Council, giving them 59 per cent more cash in years when they have a seat, according to research by economists."

⁹² In reaction to Security Council's consideration of Iran's peaceful nuclear program, the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement sent a letter to the Council President dated 21 December 2006, reflecting the Non-Aligned leaders position in this regard which, inter alia, "reaffirmed that States' choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and its fuel cycle policies must be respected." See UN Security Council, "Letter dated 21 December 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council," 22 December 2006, S/2006/1018. The OIC Foreign Ministers also "expressed concern over ... threats and pressures on Iran by certain circles to renounce its inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." OIC Resolution 18/33-P. (A/61/622-S/2006/959).

⁹³ See "The world speak on Iran's threat," *Christian Science Monitor*, 27 December 2006: "What a long 27 years it's been. But on Saturday, the U.S. finally won UN support to isolate Iranian leaders, whose 1979 Islamic revolution has become nuclear intimidation."

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